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POST-BANKRUPTCY INTEREST IN CHAPTER X
REORGANIZATIONS*
INTEREST accruing after the commencement of reorganization proceedings,
unlike that in ordinary bankruptcy, is not expressly treated by the governing
statute. The original English practice, geared to efficient administration and
equitable distribution of debtors' estates, generally denied post-petition inter-
est.' Otherwise, the courts reasoned, different rates attending claims of the
same priority would give rise to a continuous change in creditors' ratable
shares requiring a new basis of apportionment before every liquidating divi-
dend.2 Prejudice to creditors whose claims carried comparatively low charges
was apparently also feared. 3 Codified in part by section sixty-three of the Bank-
*In re Inland Gas Corp., 241 F.2d 374, (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 838 (1957).
1. Under English law, only interest to the date of the commission, i.e., petition, was
allowed. Ex parte Bennet, 2 Atk. 527, 26 Eng. Rep. 716 (Ch. 1743); In re London,
Windsor and Greenwich Hotels Co., [1892] 1 Ch. 639. Cf. In re Talbott, 39 Ch. D. 567
(1888). A similar practice is followed today. Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 GEo. 5, c. 59,
§ 66.
For general discussion of interest claims in insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings, see
3 COLLIER, BANKRUP'TCY 1 63.16 (14th ed. 1956) (hereinafter cited as COLLIER) ; Clark,
Contingent and Inunature Claims in Receivership Proceedings, 29 YALE L.J. 481, 486-87
(1920); Hanson, Effect of Insolvency Proceedings on Creditor's Right to Interest, 32
MicH. L. REv. 1069 (1934); Note, 58 YALE L.J. 982 (1949).
2. In re Kallak, 147 Fed. 276,277-78 (D.N.D. 1906); Bromley v. Goodere, 1 Atk. 75, 79,
26 Eng. Rep. 49, 51 (Ch. 1743) ; see 3 CoLmR 1 63.16; Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 354 (1948).
3. Alluded to in an early English case, Bromley v. Goodere, supra note 2, at 79, 26 Eng.
Rep. at 51, this rationale was clearly expounded in American Iron and Steel Mfg. Co. v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261, 266 (1914). "If all claims were of equal dignity and
all bore the same rate of interest, from the date of receivership to the date of final
distribution, it would be immaterial whether the dividend was calculated on the
basis of principal alone or of principal and interest combined. But some of the debts might
carry a high rate and some a low rate, and hence inequality would result in the payment
of interest which accrued during the delay incident to collecting and distributing the funds.
As this delay was the act of law, no one should thereby gain an advantage or suffer a
loss."
However, the court-imposed delay does not affect claimants whose interest-bearing debts
are not due on the date of petition. For until their debts become due, their contractual
disadvantage of a lower interest rate would continue, irrespective of delay caused by
bankruptcy proceedings or any other external event. The English rule accordingly recog-
nizes an exception for such creditors. See In re Browne & Wingrove, [1891] 2 Q.B. 574
(C.A.) (allowing post-bankruptcy interest on debts not payable at date of petition).
Section 63 (a) (1) of the American Bankruptcy Act provides for a rebate of unearned interest
on debts not payable and not carrying interest at the time of bankruptcy. 30 STAT. 563
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1952).
Moreover, this rationale is accurate only if the rate of earnings of the debtor's estate
during bankruptcy is lower than the highest interest charge. Otherwise, all creditors
benefit by any delay. And, if denying interest protects low rate debts, it also penalizes
high rate creditors. See Tredegar Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 183 Fed. 289 (4th Cir.
1910) (rule protects debtor while unable to use property). For application of the rule
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ruptcy Act,4 the English rule has long been followed by American courts de-
termining creditors' rights in ordinary bankruptcy.5 More recently, a congres-
sional intent to equate tax claims with other debts for purposes of the rule was
invoked by the Supreme Court to disallow, in ordinary bankruptcy, post-
petition interest on taxes owed a municipality.6 Two years later, assuming
that tax claims were to be accorded similar treatment in reorganizations under
Chapter X, the Court affirmed an order denying interest in United States v.
Edens.7 The English rule was thus employed even though post-bankruptcy
to contests between creditors of differing priorities, see The American Cas. Ins. Co.'s Case,
82 Md. 535, 34 Atl. 778 (1896); Annot., 69 A.L.R. 1210 (1930) (collecting cases).
iBut see Spring Coal Co. v. Keech, 239 Fed. 48 (4th Cir. 1916).
4. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1952). Section 63(a)(1) dis-
allows post-petition interest on fixed liabilities absolutely owing at the filing date if evi-
denced by a judgment or an instrument in writing. Moreover, a rebate of interest is required
on debts not payable as of that date and not providing for interest. See note 3 supra.
Section 63(a) (5) compels a creditor of a provable debt reduced to judgment between
the petition's filing and consideration of the bankrupt's application for discharge to deduct
interest accruing between filing and entry of the judgment. Other claims, such as contract
claims allowed separately by § 63(a) (4), may fall under § 63(a) (1)'s denial of interest.
See 3 COLLIER 1111 63.23-.24. Post-bankruptcy interest on claims to which §§ 63(a) (1)
and (a) (5) do not apply presumably are covered by the common-law rule as adopted by
American courts. See Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339 (1911).
5. Ibid; In re Berrian, 3 Fed. Cas. 283, No. 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1873). The rule is
also applied in bank liquidations, Merrill v. National Bank, 173 U.S. 131 (1899);
Taylor v. Picher, 13 F. Supp. 857 (D. Me. 1936), aff'd per curiam, 87 F.2d 735 (1st Cir.
1937) ; cf. Ticonic Nat'l Bank v. Sprague, 303 U.S. 406 (1938), in equity receiverships,
American Iron and Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261 (1914) ; Thomas
v. Western Car Co., 149 U.S. 95 (1893), and in general assignments for the benefit of
creditors, In the Matter of Pavone Textile Corp., 302 N.Y. 206, 97 N.E.2d 755 (1951),
aff'd sub norn. United States v. Bloom, 342 U.S. 912 (1952).
6. New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328 (1949). Under the present Bankruptcy Act, as orig-
inally promulgated, tax claims were given preferential treatment. Contrary to the practice for
ordinary debts, an affirmative duty was imposed upon the trustee to ascertain the amount
of taxes due and to obtain an order from the court for payment. § 57(n), 30 STAT. 561
(1898). In addition, taxes were given absolute priority. § 64, 30 STAT. 563 (1898).
Because these sections eliminated any administrative inconvenience, post-bankruptcy
interest was allowed. In re Kallak, 147 Fed. 276 (D.N.D. 1906). The Supreme Court
found a congressional intent to alter the treatment of tax claims in amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act requiring taxes to be proved like ordinary debts and reducing them to
the fourth priority. 52 STAT. 867, 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 93(n), 104 (1952), New
York v. Saper, supra. But see note 38 infra.
7. 342 U.S. 912 (1952), affirming per curiam 189 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1951). See also
New York v. Feinberg, 204 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1953) (tax claims); Meinhard, Greef &
Co. v. Brown, 199 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1952) (secured creditors). Contra, In rc Lexington
Homes, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 482 (D.N.J. 1950) (tax claims). The rule has also been
extended into arrangement proceedings under Chapter XI. Massachusetts v. Thompson,
190 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 918 (1952) ; United States v. General
Engineering & M.ffg. Co., 188 F.2d 80 (Sth Cir. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 342 U.S. 912
(1952). Dicta in New York v. Feinberg, supra at 502, and Meinhard, Greef & Co. v.
Brown, supra at 74, implied that the rule should encompass all claims prosecuted under
Chapter X. For discussion of the tax cases, see Schwartz, Post-Bankruptcy Interest and
Penalties Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, 30 REF. 3. 88 (1956).
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NOTES
interest had been regularly allowed in reorganizations prior to the enactment
of Chapter X,8 which is silent on the point, and despite the fact that the typically
extended duration of the proceedings makes interest especially significant. 9
In the recent case of In re Inland Gas Corp., the Sixth Circuit applied
Edens to interest due ordinary creditors. 10 Thirty years before Inland, Ameri-
can Fuel & Power Company, a parent of Kentucky Fuel Gas Corporation and
Inland Gas Corporation, planned a new pipeline to the Detroit area to avoid
financial collapse of the American system." Since this project jeopardized its
monopoly in the area, Columbia Gas & Electric Company aborted the program by
acquiring control of the American group and effecting institution of liquidation
proceedings against all three corporations.' 2 Held to violate section seven of the
Clayton Act,' 3 Columbia's conduct forced subordination of its claims to all other
8. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); In re Deep
Rock Oil Corp., 113 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 699 (1940); In re Min-
nesota & Ontario Paper Co., SEC Reorg. Release No. 33 (Aug. 1, 1940). But see
Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
9. Of the forty-three Chapter X proceedings in which the SEC participated in 1957,
petitions had been filed as follows; 1934-2; 1935-3; 1938-1; 1939-1; 1941-2; 1942-1;
1944-1; 1945-1; 1946-1; 1947-2; 1948-2; 1949-4; 1950-1; 1951-2; 1952-1; 1953-2;
1954-3; 1955-2; 1956-8; 1957-3. See SEC ANNUAL REP. 232 (1957). See also Billyou, A
Decade of Corporate Reorganization under Chapter X, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 456, 495 n.267
(1949). For data on railroad reorganizations, see Dembitz, Progress and Delay in Rail-
road Reorganizations since 1933, 7 LA.w & CONTEMP. PROB. 393 (1940).
Frequently, claims to post-petition interest exceed principal in amount. See, e.g.,
Petition for Certiorari by Paul Kern, p. 5, Kern v. Williamson, 355 U.S. 838 (1957) (bond
principal, $2,778,600; post-petition interest, $4,217,992).
10. 241 F.2d 374 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 838 (1957). For a complete history
of the Inland reorganization, see In the Matter of Inland Gas Corp., 217 F.2d 207 (6th
Cir. 1954); In re Inland Gas Corp., 211 F.2d 381 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840
(1954) ; In re Inland Gas Corp., 208 F.2d 13 (6th Cir. 1953) ; In re Inland Gas Corp.,
187 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1951) ; Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp. v. United States, 151 F.2d 461
(6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 737 (1946) ; It re American Fuel & Power Co., 122
F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1941) ; Hamilton Gas Co. v. Inland Gas Corp., 102 F2d 131 (6th Cir.
1939).
11. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp. v. United States, supra note 10, at 464.
12. Id. at 469. The Inland proceedings began as an equity receivership. Although
a reorganization device, equity receivership was in form a liquidation. A sale of assets
occurred outside the court, and the creditors received new securities from the purchaser. Con-
sequently, post-bankruptcy interest was generally denied. American Iron and Steel Mfg.
Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261 (1914); Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149
U.S. 95 (1893). In contrast, Chapter X reorganization is designed to avoid winding
up, sales of assets and distribution of proceeds. It re Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co.,
SEC Reorg. Release No. 33 (Aug. 1, 1940); see also 6 COLLIER II 0.04[2]; Glenn, The
Basis of the Federal Receivership, 25 CoLum. L. REv. 434 (1925).
13. In re American Fuel & Power Co., 122 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1941). Section 7 pro-
,'des: "No corporation ... shall acquire... the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital . . . of another corporation where . . . the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly .... " 38 STAT.
731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
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creditors and equity interests.14 Nevertheless, the Inland court disapproved
a reorganization plan providing for payment of post-bankruptcy interest to
unsubordinated creditors. In so doing, it enabled Columbia either to partici-
pate in a reorganized company or to share in liquidation of the old system.r
Following Edens, Inland is based on the "general rule" that interest ceases
to accrue after the petition in bankruptcy. 6 But since post-bankruptcy interest
is allowed where creditors' substantive rights outweigh the inconvenience of
recomputation, such a formulation is accurate only in so far as it ignores all
relevant exceptions. When a bankrupt estate proves solvent, for example,
interest to the date of the last liquidating dividend is paid before any return
is made to the debtor.' 7 Similarly, a secured creditor receives post-bankruptcy
interest to the extent his security exceeds the amount of his principal claim.' 8
14. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp. v. United States, 151 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1945).
Originally, Columbia's claims had been rejected in a suit to which it was not a party.
In re American Fuel & Power Co., 122 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1941).
Inland was the only corporation of the American system with valuable assets, and
bonds of American and Kentucky had been sold to the public on the faith of its pledged
stock. Consequently, bondholders of American and Kentucky were considered "quasi
creditors" of Inland. Since claims may be subordinated below debts of any rank, Colum-
bia Gas & Elec. Corp. v. United States, supra; cf. Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist,
316 U.S. 89 (1942), these creditors became entitled to share in Inland's assets prior
to Columbia's direct claims. In re Inland Gas Corp., 187 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1951). See
also Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Corp., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); Israels, The Inpli-
cations and Limitations of the "Deep Rock" Doctrine, 42 CoLum. L. REv. 376 (1942).
Although the antitrust laws provide their own sanctions, a bankruptcy court may
subordinate creditors whose conduct violates those statutes. See Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295 (1939). Otherwise, subordination would be restricted to less flagrant wrong-
doers. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp. v. United States, supra at 469-70.
15. 241 F.2d at 379.
16. Id. at 381. Actually, Inland is based on both Edens and New York v. Saper, 336
U.S. 328 (1949). See text at note 6 supra. The transmutation of an administrative
practice into a substantive rule stems from references to the "general rule" by the Supreme
Court in the context of ordinary bankruptcy. See, e.g., Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339
(1911).
Often described as -"ceasing to accrue" or "stopping" with the petition, see, e.g., New
York v. Saper, supra at 330, post-bankruptcy interest may more accurately be portrayed
as "suspended." See Sword Line, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'r, 212 F.2d 865, 872 (2d Cir.)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 830 (1954). This formulation accords with
the allowance of interest under the so-called "exceptions." See notes 17-19 infra and
accompanying text. See also Johnson v. Norris, 190 Fed. 459 (5th Cir. 1911) ; Hanson,
supra note 1, at 1086; Notes, 54 CoLU-m. L. R v. 1293 (1954), 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 716 (1955).
17. Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223 (1909) ; Miles Corp. v. Lindel, 107 F.2d 729 (Sth Cir.
1939) ; In re Norcor Mfg. Co., 36 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
18. In re Macomb Trailer Coach, Inc., 200 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 958 (1953); Kagan v. Industrial Washing Mach. Corp., 182 F.2d 139 (1st
Cir. 1950) ; In re Gotham Can Co., 48 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1931) ; cf. Beecher v. Leaven-
worth State Bank, 192 F.2d 10, 14 (9th Cir. 1951). This exception apparently honors a
secured creditor's contractual rights in his security. See People's Homestead Ass'n v.
Bartlette, 33 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1929) (allowing interest to date of sale of the mortgaged
property where the proceeds covered principal and interest).
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Even if the security is not of greater value than the claim, return on collateral
held by a secured creditor is applied to post-petition interest.19 Moreover, section
sixty-three, limiting provable claims and denying post-petition interest to certain
debts in ordinary bankruptcy, is expressly inapplicable in corporate reorganiza-
tions.20 Section 196, in contrast, commands broad judicial discretion in allow-
ing claims prosecuted under Chapter X.2" The status of interest accruing after
a reorganization petition should, therefore, be governed by administrative and
equitable considerations rather than simple application of a general rule neither
general nor rule.
22
Administrative factors dictating denial of post-petition interest in ordinary
bankruptcy are absent in corporate reorganizations. Chapter X reorganiza-
tion plans ordinarily enable the debtor to continue business in a revitalized cor-
porate structure.2 3 Only at consummation of the plan are enforceable creditor
rights in the reorganized company established. Consequently, a single compu-
19. Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339 (1911) (based on aversion to allowing debtor to
profit by court-imposed delay) ; Pacific States Corp. v. Hall, 166 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1948)
(dictum); see In re E. W. Hays & Co., 12 F. Supp. 130 (W.D. Ky. 1935).
To prevent abuse where security will not cover both principal and post-petition interest,
a creditor may not apply the proceeds first against interest. 3 COLLIER 11 63.16(2).
20. Section 106(1) of Chapter X includes ". . . all claims of whatever character
against a debtor or its property . . . whether or not such claims are provable under
section 63 of this Act . . . ." 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 506(1) (1952). As a matter
of judicial construction, "claims" in reorganization encompass all liabilities of the debtor.
In re Plankinton Bldg. Co., 135 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1943); see it re International
ky., 95 F. Supp. 140 (W.D.N.Y. 1949) (including a city's unliquidated claim against
the debtor for future cost of removing trolley tracks).
21. "[T]he judge shall prescribe the manner in which and fix a time within which
the proofs of claims of creditors . . . may be filed and allowed. Objections by any party
in interest to the allowance of any such claims or interests shall be heard and summarily
determined by the court." 52 STAT. 893 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 596 (1952).
22. "Under the general rule of law, the debtor is required to pay interest up to the
time he pays his debt." Johnson v. Norris, 190 Fed. 459, 463 (5th Cir. 1911), cert. denied,
232 U.S. 723 (1914). One commentator suggests that the "general rule" is really the
exception and that interest should be allowed unless administratively inconvenient. 3
COLLIER ff 63.16. The formulation, however, is more than a problem of semantics. The
Inland court, for instance, finding no precedent for an "exception," felt controlled by
the "general rule." 241 F.2d at 381-82.
23. Unlike ordinary bankruptcy, reorganization is essentially a rehabilitative rather
than a liquidation procedure. See In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 77 F.2d 328 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 584 (1935). But a reorganization plan may provide for liquidation
and dissolution. Country Life Apartments, Inc. v. Buckley, 145 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1944) ;
it re V. Loewer's Gambrinus Brewery Co., 141 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1944); cf. Fidelity
Assurance Ass'n v. Sims, 318 U.S. 608 (1943) (petition in Chapter X not filed in good
faith where no chance of reorganization exists and liquidation is the only object). See
also Cary, Liquidations of Corporations in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 60 HARv. L. REv.
173 (1946). Under certain circumstances, §§ 236-38 dictate dismissing a reorganization
before a plan has been evolved and instituting ordinary bankruptcy proceedings. 52 STAT.
899-900 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 636-38 (1952).
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tation is all that is required whether or not post-bankruptcy interest is allowed. 24
Nor is recomputation necessary even if, as in Inland, a sale of the old company's
assets and dissolution of its corporate form is contemplated by the plan.2
Thus unsupported by considerations of administrative expediency, Inland's
denial of post-petition interest also contradicts the rationale of equitable sub-
ordination. 26 Triggered by illegal or unfair conduct, subordination postpones
the offending creditor's participation in a debtor's estate until full satisfaction of
the claims of prejudiced creditors and shareholders.27 Admittedly, an inflexible
rule universally denying interest would allow full legal compensation irrespec-
tive of loss of interest. But the unsubordinated creditors of the American system
have been deprived of the use of capital for twenty-seven years of reorganization
proceedings.28 And since their principal claims would have exhausted the
24. See In re Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., SEC Reorg. Release No. 33 (Aug. 1,
1940). See also 6 COLLIER f 11.13. Allowing interest to the date of payment may be
impractical because the delay intervening between proposal and consummation of the
plan might necessitate a readjustment in relative participations. See Consolidated Rock
Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 514, 527 (1941) (allowing post-petition interest
to date of the plan). But see note 39 infra.
Originally, the ICC allowed post-bankruptcy interest in railroad reorganizations. Denver
& R.G.W.R.R. Reorganization, 233 I.C.C. 515 (1939); Spokane Int'l Ry. Reorganization,
228 I.C.C. 387 (1938). Recently, however, relying on Group of Institutional Investors
v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943), it has denied such interest to
secured creditors with deficiency claims. Florida East Coast Ry. Reorganization, 282 I.C.C.
81 (1951). Institutional Investors, based on a case involving a bank liquidation, Ticonic
Nat'l Bank v. Sprague, 303 U.S. 406 (1938), has thus become the foundation for disallow-
ing interest to secured creditors with deficiency claims in Chapter X.
However, this denial may be particularly inappropriate in Chapter X. If the security
is a wasting asset, it will be constantly diminished by conversion into free assets. Since
the secured creditor cannot foreclose on his security during reorganization, he will be
unable to protect his preferred position. Such a creditor seems particularly deserving
of post-petition interest on a deficiency claim. In re Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., supra.
See Note, 50 YALE LJ. 144 (1940).
25. Liquidation in this instance follows consummation of the plan rather than filing
of the petition. See note 23 supra.
26. "Subordination is a means of regulating distribution results . . . by adjusting the
order of creditors' payments to the equitable levels of their comparative claim positions
... [I]ts fundamental aim is to undo or to offset any inequity in the claim position of a
creditor that will produce injustice or unfairness to other creditors . . . ." In re Kansas
City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791, 800 (8th Cir. 1944). See also Prudence Realization
Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942).
Construing Inland narrowly, the trustee's amended plan allows post-bankruptcy interest
to subordinated creditors prior to the payment of such interest to senior bondholders.
In the Matter of Inland Gas Corp., SEC Reorg. Release No. 109 (May 1, 1958)
(disapproving this allowance as unfair).
27. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); In re Deep Rock
Oil Corp., 113 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 699 (1940).
In Inland, the claims of Columbia and of the unsubordinated creditors were based on
the same securities.
28. See note 10 supra. Interest is generally considered compensation for the use of
capital rather than a penalty for delay in payment. Note, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 553, 555
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system's assets if the proceedings had been more expeditiously conducted, 29
denial of interest seems an anomalous implementation of subordination doc-
trine.30 For it allows Columbia to benefit from the return on capital invested
by the very parties whom its illegal conduct injured.3 '
In comparable fashion, the Inland approach ignores the thrust of the absolute
priority rule. Adopted to prevent controlling shareholders from retaining
interests in a debtor corporation to the detriment of creditors with outstanding
claims, 3 2 the rule currently commands full compensation to senior creditors
before any participation is permitted juniors.33 just as preferred stockholders
(1947). But if excessive, it may become a penalty which is disallowed on government
claims by § 57(j) of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 867 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
93(j) (1952), District of Columbia v. Greenbaum, 223 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1955), and
by case law on all other claims, see Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329
U.S. 156 (1946). For the applicability of § 57(j) in Chapter X, see note 41 infIra. More-
over, a covenant to pay interest upon interest in the event of default is void as against
"equitable principles" of bankruptcy administration regardless of its validity under state
law. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, supra.
Vanston did not decide whether a covenant to compound interest is void under federal
law or whether its validity would be determined by applicable state law. Some federal
courts had previously distinguished between interest and compound interest. See, e.g.,
American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 26 F. Supp. 954
(S.D.N.Y. 1939). But since compound interest differs from interest on interest only in
degree, it should fall under the equitable principles of Vanstdn. See Transbel Inv. Co. v.
Roth, 36 F. Supp. 396, 398-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
If Vanston is inapplicable, compound interest presents a difficult conflicts problem.
If a large bond indenture is executed in one state but the corporation's primary place
of business is in another and the secured assets are in a third while products are sold
in all forty-eight, the state of most significant contacts will be difficult to determine.
See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, supra; cf. concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, id. at 167.
29. 241 F.2d at 379.
30. See, generally, Clark, Interest on Clainms in Receivership Proceedings, 19 Micx.
L. Rxv. 35 (1920).
31. Inland may also limit an equity court's power to subordinate claims. Whether the
district court based its disallowance of interest on equitable grounds or the "general rule"
is not clear. See Transcript of Proceedings, March 8, 1956, pp. 46-50, In re Inland Gas
Corp., 241 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1957). But since the Sixth Circuit assumed that the
"general rule" controlled, subordination is effectively limited to principal. In contrast,
the Supreme Court has described the power of a bankruptcy court to subordinate claims
as "complete." Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941).
See also note 14 mpra; In re Deep Rock Oil Corp., 113 F2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 699 (1940) (allowing post-bankruptcy interest before participation of sub-
ordinated creditors).
32. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913) (equity receivership); see Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) (absolute priority an aspect of
the "fair and equitable" requirement of Chapter X); see also 2 DEwING, FINANCIAL
POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 1299-334 (5th ed. 1953).
33. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); In the Matter
of 620 Church Street Bldg. Corp., 299 U.S. 24 (1936) ; In re Day & Meyer, Murray &
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are entitled to unpaid dividends accumulating subsequent to bankruptcy al-
though such payments eliminate junior shareholders from the reorganized
company, 34 senior creditors appear to deserve recognition of their equivalent
contract right to post-petition interest.3 True, junior creditors may suffer
- from the delay of reorganization if senior creditors are paid interest exceeding
the return on the estate's capital during Chapter X proceedings.36 But if
interest is denied, capital invested by senior creditors may produce a return
accruing only to junior interests. Since either alternative may prejudice one
group while benefiting the other, absolute priority dictates that contract prece-
dence include claims to post-bankruptcy interest.37
Young, Inc., 93 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1938). Full compensation encompasses more than
recognition of a claim's face amount; "provision must be made for the entire bundle of
rights" which a class surrenders. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, supra at
528. Thus, allowance must be made for such rights as date of maturity or position as
lienholder. See Note, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 399, 464 (1941).
34. ln re Deep Rock Oil Corp., 113 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 699
(1940). See also Central States Elec. Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1951) ; Petition of Portland Elec. Power Co., 162 F.2d 618
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 837 (1947).
35. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941) (post-petition
interest allowed and entitled to the same priority as the principal claim). Although
interferences with contract rights causing inconvenience in reorganization have been
sanctioned by the Supreme Court, the rights involved in such cases were classified merely
as remedial. Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445 (1937) (landlord's right to
stipulated damages for future rental liability) ; Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935) (pledgee's power of sale). But see
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 86 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 661
(1937) (right of trustee under an indenture to accelerate maturity upon insolvency is
substantive).
36. Senior creditors causing delay in order to profit from a contractual interest rate
exceeding that prevailing in the market should, of course, not be allowed to benefit from
such activity. See Thomas v. Western Car Co., 149 U.S. 95, 116 (1893) (disallowing
interest for "extortionate delays"); Georgia, F. & A.R.R. v. Bankers Trust Co., 170
F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1948) (creditor may lose interest claim by obstructive conduct).
37. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); see In re
Lexington Homes, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 482 (D.N.J. 1950) (absolute priority compels payment
of post-bankruptcy interest on tax claims in Chapter X). But when extending the English
rule to tax claims under Chapters X and XI, courts have usually avoided the mandate
of absolute priority by either ignoring its applicability, United States v. Edens, 189 F.2d
876 (4th Cir. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 342 U.S. 912 (1952) ; see Massachusetts v. Thompson,
190 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1951) ; cf. dissenting opinion, id. at 11, or by recognizing priorities only
as of the petition date, New York v. Feinberg, 204 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1953). See 66 STAT.
433, 11 U.S.C. § 766(1952) (eliminating fair and equitable requirement from Chapter XI).
Where interest is not contractually stipulated, it has been allowed as damages for de-
tention of the debt. New York Trust Co. v. Detroit, T. & I. Ry., 251 Fed. 514 (6th Cir.
1918) ; Spring Coal Co. v. Keech, 239 Fed. 48 (4th Cir. 1916) (dictum). Such interest
is granted in ordinary bankruptcy where the estate proves solvent. See American Iron
and Steel Mfg. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261 (1914).
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Like the Inland decision it fostered, Edens should be discarded. The hold-
ing on which Edens was based, applying the English rule to tax claims in
ordinary bankruptcy because of a legislative intent more presumed than demon-
strated,38 may be justified by administrative convenience39 and possible gov-
ernment power to recoup post-petition interest after discharge.40 But neither
rationale is relevant to tax claims under Chapter X.41 If the rule should be
applied to taxes owed at the beginning of reorganization proceedings to protect
creditors from government acquisition of a disproportionate share of a debtor's
estate,4 2 such a decision belongs more properly to the legislature than the
courts. Since Congress has altered the priority of tax claims only in ordinary
38. New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328 (1949); see note 6 supra. Nothing in the
legislative history of the amendments warranted the finding that Congress intended to
assimilate tax claims to ordinary debts for purposes of the rule. Saper v. New York,
168 F.2d 268, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1948). Moreover, their present fourth priority still differ-
entiates such claims from private unsecured debts. And a proposed amendment explicitly
disallowing interest was never passed. See Note, 58 YALE L.J. 982, 990 n.36 (1949).
Congress, nevertheless, has implicitly approved Saper. H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1952).
39. See 61 HARv. L. REv. 354 (1948). Recomputation will be required when tax
claims bear different interest rates. If historically impracticable, recomputation would
not appear to create undue inconvenience today.
40. Under § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, tax claims are not dischargeable. 30 STAT.
550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1952). Whether post-bankruptcy interest
can be recovered as part of a nondischargeable tax claim is uncertain. Compare Sword
Line, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'r, 212 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 830 (1954)
(denying recovery), with 212 F.2d at 870 (dissenting opinion) ; Note, 53 YALE L.J. 982
(1949). See also 54 CoLuM. L. REv. 1293 (1954), 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 716 (1955), 40 VA.
L. REv. 937 (1954).
3 COLLIER 63.16 states that discharge does not affect a debt which is not provable and
hence cannot destroy a claim to post-petition interest. See also Matter of Paley, 260 App.
Div. 632, 23 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1st Dep't 1940) ; Matter of the Utica Pipe Foundry Co., 36
Am. Bankr. R. 217 (N.D.N.Y. 1916) (allowing interest on dividend originally withheld
by trustee as preference).
41. Section 17 is inapplicable in Chapter X. 52 STAT. 899 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 628(1)
(1952). See American Serv. Co. v. Henderson, 120 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1941). See also
note 24 supra and accompanying text (lack of administrative inconvenience in Chapter X).
Section 57(j) provides in part: "Debts owing to the United States or to any state...
as a penalty . . . shall not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary loss
sustained by the act, transaction ... and such interest as may have accrued on the amount
of such loss according to law." 52 STAT. 867 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93(j) (1952).
Congress has indicated that in ordinary bankruptcy accruing "according to law" means
up to the date of petition. H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1952). Although
§ 57(j) is probably applicable in Chapter X, 6 COLLIE ff 9.04, at 2790-91 n.17, it merely
restates whatever rule is otherwise relevant.
42. "Those most immediately concerned with administration of the [Bankruptcy] Act
have frequently expressed dissatisfaction over the inroads taxes and interest thereon make
in the fund available for creditors." New York v. Saper, 336 U.S. 328, 329 n.5 (1949).
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bankruptcy,43 it apparently has not intended to extend this safeguard to creditors
claiming under Chapter X.
43. See note 6 supra. Compare § 199 of the Chandler Act, 52 STAT. 893 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§ 599 (1952) (first priority to United States tax claims), with § 77B(e), 48 STAT. 911
(1934), as amended, 49 Stat. 965 (1935) (same) ; see Developments in the Law-Reorgan-
ization Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 Hv. L. Rav. 1111, 1179 (1936).
Nor have tax priorities of state and other governmental subdivisions been altered by Chapter
X. See 6 CoLUER f1 9.13 [3].
